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HABEAS CORPUS-FEDERAL COURTS-EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES IN
STATE COURTS-MIXED PETITIONS-The United States Supreme
Court has held that a federal district court must dismiss a state
prisoner's habeas corpus petition based on alleged federal constitu-
tional violations when it contains both claims which have been ex-
hausted in the state courts and claims which have not been ex-
hausted; the prisoner may amend or resubmit his petition so that
it states only exhausted claims, or return to the state courts with
his unexhausted claims.
Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982).
Noah Lundy was convicted of rape and crime against nature in a
Tennessee court on August 24, 1973, and received consecutive pen-
itentiary sentences of 120 years and 5 to 15 years.' Lundy appealed
to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, alleging two federal
constitutional claims which he also later alleged in federal court.'
In spite of these claims, Lundy's conviction was affirmed by the
criminal court of appeals.3 Lundy then filed a state petition for
post-conviction relief, in which he alleged only that his appointed
counsel was incompetent. Relief was denied on May 3, 1976."
Lundy subsequently filed a petition in federal district court for
habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.5 Lundy stated a total
1. Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1199 & n.1 (1982).
2. Id. at 1199-1200 & n.2. The first of Lundy's federal constitutional claims raised in
the Tennessee courts was that the trial judge had improperly limited the cross-examination
of the rape victim by defense counsel. The trial judge had ruled that she could not be im-
peached by statements she had made to defense counsel in a pre-trial interview, because the
defense counsel had identified himself only as a "lawyer in the case," without stating that he
was employed by the defendant. This ruling was alleged to have denied Lundy his sixth
amendment right of confrontation. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
trial court's ruling was "too restrictive," because counsel was under no duty to identify his
role in the case before interviewing the witness, but the court also held that the error was
"harmless in the context of this case." Lundy v. State, 521 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1974), review denied No. 283 (Tenn. Mar. 10, 1975). Lundy's other claim before the
Tennessee courts was that he was denied due process, in that he had been deprived of a fair
trial by the prosecutor's remark that he had a violent character; this was also held harmless
in the overall context of the case. 521 S.W.2d at 595.
3. Id. at 596.
4. Lundy v. Rose, No. C412 (Knox Co. Crim. Ct. May 3, 1976). See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Joint Appendix at 62.
5. 102 S. Ct. at 1199. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
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of four federal constitutional grounds for relief, including a restate-
ment of the two claims already ruled on by the Tennessee courts,
as well as two claims not previously raised.' In short, Lundy filed a
mixed habeas corpus petition with two exhausted and two
unexhausted claims.
7
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that
the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that
there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of
circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
6. 102 S. Ct. at 1199. The first of these additional claims (the third claim in the peti-
tion) was that the remark by the prosecutor in his closing argument-that the evidence
submitted by the State was uncontradicted-was improper. Id. In his petition, Lundy com-
plained that the prosecutor's remarks to the jury that the State's witnesses (the rape victim
and Lundy's companion) had been the only ones to testify, "were directed at the failure of
the defendant to testify," in violation of his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Joint Appendix at 74. The State's reply to this contention in
the federal district court was that "the prosecutor was not trying to comment on the defen-
dant's failure to testify but merely was pointing out that the State's evidence was uncontra-
dicted by the defendant, which argument is permissible." Id. at 84.
The second new claim (the fourth claim in Lundy's habeas corpus petition) was that the
judge improperly invaded the province of the jury by his instruction that every witness is
presumed to tell the truth. 102 S. Ct. at 1199. The State replied, at the district court level,
that the instruction was "given in accordance with state law," and that it did not "so mis-
state the law that the entire trial resulted in a conviction which violated petitioner's due
process of law." See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Joint Appendix at 85.
7. 102 S. Ct. at 1199. Lundy filed such a petition despite the instructions to the con-
trary given in question 12 of the Model Form for Use in Applications for Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (1976). Federal habeas petitioners are re-
quired by Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts are required to use this form. 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (1976). In question 12, the peti-
tioner is instructed to:
State concisely every ground on which you claim you are being held unlawfully. Sum-
marize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary you may attach pages
stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.
Caution: In order to proceed in the federal court, you must ordinarily first ex-
haust your state court remedies as to each ground on which you request action
by the federal court. If you fail to set forth all grounds in this petition, you
may be barred from presenting additional grounds at a later date.
For your information, the following is a list of the most frequently raised grounds
for relief in habeas groups proceedings. Each statement preceded by a letter consti-
tutes a separate ground for possible relief. You may raise any grounds which you may
have other than those listed if you have exhausted your state remedies with respect
to them. However, you should raise in this petition all available grounds (relating to
this conviction) on which you base your allegations that you are being held
unlawfully.
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The United States District Court for the Middle District of Ten-
nessee granted Lundy the relief sought on March 21, 1979.8 The
district court reviewed the records of the state courts and recog-
nized that it could not consider claims three and four because state
remedies had not been exhausted as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254.9
The district court, however, thought that in assessing Lundy's first
and second claims, which did meet the exhaustion requirement, it
would be necessary to refer to the overall factual setting of the
trial by reference to ten instances of alleged prosecutorial miscon-
duct, some of which supported the claims not exhausted by
Lundy.'0 Also, although the court apparently did not actually pre-
mise its grant of relief upon Lundy's fourth claim - that the jury
was improperly charged that every witness is presumed to tell the
28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (1976) (italics in original). A list of possible grounds for relief follows,
with space provided in which four grounds (A through D) may be alleged and supporting
facts given. 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (1976). In his petition, Lundy alleged his exhausted
grounds as (A) and (B), and his unexhausted grounds as (C) and (D). See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Joint Appendix at 71-75.
Question 13 of the Model Form then instructs the petitioner that:
If any of the grounds listed in 12 A, B, C and D were not previously presented in any
other court, state or federal, state briefly what grounds were not so presented, and
give your reasons for not presenting them.
28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (1976) (italics in original). In his petition, Lundy's reply to question
13 was:
C and D grounds of this petition have not been previously presented to any other
court (State or Federal) in any petition, or motion, or application because the defen-
dant was not aware that this proscedure [sic] might be a violation of his rights as
secured to him by the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution as
defendant's court appointed counsel had not objected to either coments [sic] of the
Attorney General or trial court's instructions to trial jury in the matters set forth in
grounds (C and D).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Joint Appendix at 75.
8. Lundy v. Thompson, No. 79-3081 NA-CV (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 1979), affd sub
nom. Lundy v. Rose, 624 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982).
9. 102 S. Ct. at 1199.
10. Id. at 1199-1200. Justice O'Connor, in her opinion for the United States Supreme
Court, noted that the petitioner (Tennessee) conceded that five of the alleged instances of
prosecutorial misconduct had been considered in the state courts. However, it was undis-
puted that Lundy had never objected in the Tennessee courts to the prosecutor's statement
that the victim was telling the truth, or to any of the several instances in which the prosecu-
tor allegedly gave his personal evaluation of the evidence. These instances constituted the
factual basis for the third claim in Lundy's federal habeas corpus petition. The petitioner
also noted that three other instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct which were not
presented in the state courts could not properly be considered misconduct anyway. Two of
them did not occur in front of the jury, and the other consisted only of an objection to
defense counsel's cross examination of the victim. Id. at 1200 n.3.
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truth - it implied that the charge, was improper and that, when
coupled with the prosecutorial misconduct, it violated defendant's
right under the sixth amendment to a fair trial."
The district court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit.12 Tennessee then petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.'"
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, in an
opinion by Justice O'Connor,'4 and held that federal district courts
must dismiss habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners which
contain both claims which were exhausted in the state courts and
claims which were not exhausted.' 5
Justice O'Connor first noted that the Court was being urged by
the petitioner to require that the federal district courts follow a
total exhaustion rule and dismiss habeas corpus petitions contain-
ing any unexhausted claims without deciding any exhausted claims
stated in the petition.16 Such a rule, said Tennessee, would
strengthen the policy of comity which has been the basis of the
exhaustion doctrine by allowing the states the first chance to cor-
rect violations of federal constitutional rights of criminal defen-
dants.' 7 Tennessee also contended that such a rule would reduce
piecemeal litigation of a prisoner's claim by requiring him to
choose between resuming pursuit of his unexhausted claims in the
state courts, or litigating only his exhausted claims in the district
court. If he chose the latter course, he would either have to delete
the unexhausted claim from his petition or refile a new petition not
stating any unexhausted claims.' 8 Justice O'Connor noted that, in
petitioner's view, the prisoner would most likely return to the state
courts with his unexhausted claims rather than risk the loss of any
opportunity to assert them further in federal court, because to re-
11. Id. at 1200.
12. 624 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982).
13. 450 U.S. 910 (1981).
14. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined in the opinion of
Justice O'Connor. Justices Brennan and Marshall, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, joined
in parts I, II, III-A, III-B, and IV of Justice O'Connor's opinion, but did not join in part III-
C.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 1199.
16. Id. at 1201. Justice O'Connor pointed out that such a rule had already been
adopted by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Id. at n.5. See, e.g., Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582
F.2d 348, 355-60 (5th Cir. 1978); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 808-10 (9th Cir. 1976).
17. 102 S. Ct. at 1201.
18. Id.
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turn to federal court with a second habeas petition after the first
was unsuccessful might constitute an abuse of the writ which
would require dismissal of the petition."9
In discussing the merits of these arguments, Justice O'Connor
referred to the history of the exhaustion doctrine, beginning with
Ex parte Royall,20 where the Court held that as a rule, the federal
courts would not consider an alleged deprivation of federal consti-
tutional rights occurring in a state court until the state had been
given a chance to consider the claim.2' It was recognized that al-
though the federal courts shared the responsibility of enforcing the
Constitution as a matter of comity between the state and federal
judicial systems, exhaustion of state remedies would be required as
to each claim.2 Justice O'Connor found this principle to have been
further refined in United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler23 and in
Ex parte Hawk.24 These cases held, respectively, that ordinarily,
state remedies should be exhausted before the power of the federal
courts could be invoked, and that federal-state comity is the basis
of the exhaustion doctrine. In 1948, the rule of Hawk was codified
19. Id. Petitioner believed that such a dismissal would be required under Rule 9(b) of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which
provides:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the mer-
its or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the
petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ
28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (1976). Justice O'Connor agreed with the petitioner on this point. 102
S. Ct. at 1205. In the opinion of Justice Brennan, however, dismissal for "abuse of the writ"
was not required in such circumstances. Id. at 1213 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See infra note 71 and accompanying text. Whichever view is correct, as
Justice Brennan points out, "It]he issue of Rule 9(b)'s proper application to successive peti-
tions brought as a result of our decision today is not before us. .. ." 102 S. Ct. at 1211
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But that issue is raised in Justice
O'Connor's opinion because, if petitioner's opinion on the matter is incorrect, the incentive
to the inmate habeas petitioner to exhaust all of his claims in the state courts will not exist
and the envisioned furtherance of the policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine will not
result.
20. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
21. 102 S. Ct. at 1201.
22. Id. at 1201-02 (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251).
23. 269 U.S. 13, 17-19 (1925). In Tyler, involving not a mixed habeas petition but
rather one in which none of the claims had been exhausted in the state courts, the Court
held that such petitions must be dismissed, under normal circumstances. Id.
24. 321 U.S. 114, 117 (1944). Like Tyler, Hawk did not deal with a mixed petition, as
Justice O'Connor noted. 102 S. Ct. at 1202.
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by Congress as 28 U.S.C. § 2254;" but as Justice O'Connor recog-
nized, this statute does not directly address the issue of mixed pe-
titions, and it is likely that Congress was not concerned with that
issue.2 6 Therefore, the Court found it necessary to examine the pol-
icies supporting the exhaustion doctrine in order to determine the
proper scope of the statute.
2 7
The most important of these policies, explained Justice
O'Connor, is that of comity. 5 She pointed out that this policy
would be served in a number of ways by a rule requiring dismissal
of all mixed habeas corpus petitions. In the first place, the state
courts would have the first chance to review all claims of constitu-
tional error.29 Another benefit would be that state courts would be-
come more cognizant of their responsibility to protect federal con-
stitutional rights, and would be more willing to discharge this
responsibility." In addition, federal courts would be more likely to
hear habeas corpus petitions with the aid of a complete factual re-
cord compiled in the state court where the federal claims alleged
were fully exhausted.3 1
Justice O'Connor noted that the need for a total exhaustion rule
as to mixed petitions was especially well illustrated by the facts of
Lundy, where there was a mixed petition including interrelated ex-
hausted and unexhausted claims. 2 Though the district court
seemed to recognize that the unexhausted claims in Lundy's peti-
tion could not be the basis for relief, it apparently considered all of
the claims in its opinion.3 3 The effect was that the unexhausted
claims were considered. Justice O'Connor explained that this was
not only improper under the statutory codification of the exhaus-
25. 102 S. Ct. at 1202 n.8. See supra note 5.
26. Id. at 1202-03.
27. Id. at 1203.
28. Id.
29. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that "[tihe exhaustion doctrine is principally designed
to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of
state judicial proceedings." Id. (citation omitted).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1203-04. Justice O'Connor so reasoned because 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976)
requires that in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, factual findings made by the state
courts are to be presumed correct except in certain limited circumstances. 102 S. Ct. at
1203-04.
32. 102 S. Ct. at 1204. See supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text.
33. 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
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tion rules4 but also violated the general rule followed in most of the
federal circuits requiring dismissal of mixed petitions containing
interrelated exhausted and unexhausted claims .3  The Court rea-
soned that such a rule as to interrelated claims was additional sup-
port for the imposition of a total exhaustion rule, because it would
relieve the federal district courts of the difficult task of determin-
ing the interrelatedness of claims.36 Instead, habeas corpus liti-
gants in the federal courts would receive a straightforward instruc-
tion: exhaust all claims in the state courts first, or the entire
petition will be dismissed.37 The intention is not to confuse or en-
trap the prisoner-petitioner, said Justice O'Connor. Rather, it is to
simplify his task and to benefit the federal court system as well by
reducing piecemeal litigation. A more focused and thorough review
could be provided in a single proceeding.3 8
In part III-C of her opinion, which was joined by only a plurality
of the Court, 9 Justice O'Connor concluded that although the pris-
oner-petitioner who discovers that he has submitted a mixed peti-
tion is put to a choice of. either amending his petition to delete
unexhausted claims or returning to state court to exhaust those
claims; his interest in obtaining quick federal relief is not im-
paired.' 0 Such relief may still be sought by making the first choice.
But the total exhaustion rule does impose costs on the petitioner's
choice: if the choice is to delete the unexhausted claims, there is a
risk that a second petition stating these grounds (once they are
exhausted) will be held to constitute an abuse of the writ under
Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b).11 The result would be the forfeiture of
any considertion of these claims by a federal court.'2 Justice
O'Connor reached this conclusion through her interpretation of the
proper rule governing abuse -of the writ set forth in Sanders v.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976). See supra note 5.
35. 102 S. Ct. at 1204 (citing Triplett v. Wyrick, 549 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1977); Miller v.
Hall, 536 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1976); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969)).
36. 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined in part II-C of the
opinion of Justice O'Connor. Justice Brennan joined in parts I, II, 11-A, III-B, and IV of
Justice O'Connor's opinion, but did not join in part IH-C.
40. 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
41. Id. See supra note 19.
42. !02 S. Ct. at 1204.
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United States,3 in which it was held that there is an abuse of the
writ when a prisoner deliberately fails to include one of his possi-
ble grounds for relief in his habeas corpus petition or abandons it
at his first hearing, with the idea of receiving two hearings in fed-
eral court instead of one.44 This judge-made principle was incorpo-
rated into Rule 9(b) when the rule was enacted by Congress.45 Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded that because a total exhaustion rule
promotes comity and does not unreasonably impair the prisoner's
right to relief, a district court must dismiss habeas petitions con-
taining both unexhausted and exhausted claims."
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, stated that the
important issue before the Court was whether the rule that mixed
habeas petitions must be dismissed without consideration of even
the unexhausted claims was actually required by 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b) and (c). 47 He agreed with the majority of the courts of ap-
peals that it was not, and that the better rule would be to allow
district courts to review the exhausted claims of a mixed petition. 8
Noting that the Court had conceded that the legislative history of
the statute contained no reference to the mixed petition issue and
that Congress had probably not considered it in framing the stat-
ute,49 Justice Blackmun proposed that the Court's ruling would
most likely fail to achieve any of its intended purposes. Rather, it
seemed likely to both prevent deserving litigants from gaining
prompt habeas relief and at the same time to aggravate rather
than alleviate the problems of overburdened district courts.6 0 Ad-
ditionally, the Court's holding was not required by precedent.5
Turning to the policy considerations behind the Court's total ex-
haustion rule, Justice Blackmun agreed on the importance of these
43. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
44. Id. at 19.
45. 102 S. Ct. at 1204-05. See supra note 19.
46. 102 S. Ct. at 1205.
47. 102 S. Ct. at 1205 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
48. See infra note 111 for cases stating such a rule.
49. 102 S. Ct. at 1205 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1206 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated that "[ajlthough
this Court's precedents do not address specifically the appropriate treatment of mixed
habeas petitions, they plainly suggest that state courts need not inevitably be given every
opportunity to safeguard a prisoner's constitutional rights and provide him relief before a
federal court may entertain his habeas petition.". Id. The mixed petition issue was specifi-
cally reserved by the Court in Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1974).
Vol. 21:309
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considerations, but stated his opinion that they would be better
served by allowing consideration of exhausted claims in a mixed
petition. Comity between the state and federal courts, for example,
would be equally well-served, for the state courts would still have
the first opportunity to pass upon unexhausted claims before they
were considered in federal court."' In addition, there is no good
reason to require a petitioner to return to state court to exhaust a
patently frivolous claim when he has stated serious exhausted
claims in the same petition.53
Justice Blackmun next considered the interests of efficient fed-
eral judicial administration. As to the necessity of a complete fac-
tual record in ruling on habeas corpus petitions, he stated that
such a record will necessarily accompany each exhausted claim af-
ter the state courts have dispensed with that claim." Justice
Blackmun noted that the Court had emphasized the elimination of
the obligation of the federal district courts to determine whether
exhausted and unexhausted claims are interrelated. Justice Black-
mun indicated that the extreme approach adopted by the Court is
unnecessary because the district courts have always had discretion
to dismiss petitions stating such interrelated claims and, because
of their familiarity with the facts of the particular case, should re-
tain such discretion.
55
Justice Blackmun also pointed out that the federal courts are
perfectly capable of deciding when habeas claims are interrelated,
and that there are compelling reasons of judicial economy for leav-
ing this decision with the district courts.56 Justice Blackmun cited
the decisions of various courts of appeals on the interrelatedness
question,5 7 and noted that federal courts that have addressed this
52. 102 S. Ct. at 1206-07 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 1207 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1208 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. Id. See, e.g., Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967, 969 (1st Cir. 1967) (dismissing a mixed
habeas petition when "the issues before the federal court logically depend for their rele-
vance upon resolution of an unexhausted issue"); United States ex rel. McBride v. Fay, 370
F.2d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1976) (dismissing a mixed petition when consideration of the ex-
hausted claim "would necessarily be affected" by the exhausted claim). Justice Blackmun
stated that one of the factors determining whether claims are interrelated is whether they
are based on the same constitutional right or factual issue. Another factor is whether the
district court must reach an understanding of "the totality of the circumstances" through an
examination of the entire record in order to consider the claims. 102 S. Ct. at 1207 (Black-
1982
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issue have had no problems distinguishing related from unrelated
habeas claims. 8 Of course, even this effort would apparently be
unnecessary under a total exhaustion rule, but Justice Blackmun
pointed out that there would still be an expenditure of judicial re-
sources under such a rule because at least a summary review of all
petitions would be required to determine if there were any
unexhausted claims. In many of these cases, a district court could
and should proceed to a decision on the merits.5
Finally, Justice Blackmun noted that a total exhaustion rule
could sacrifice the interest of the prisoner and of society in retain-
ing a means of immediate relief from unconstitutional imprison-
ment. 0 This is because the prisoner would be forced to choose be-
tween the forfeiture of any opportunity to proceed with some of
his claims if he proceeds in federal court and the loss of a swift
remedy if he returns to the state courts.61 The Court justified this
by citing the alleged necessity of preventing sophisticated prisoner-
petitioners from filing successive petitions alleging different claims.
Justice Blackmun, however, pointed out that the total exhaustion
rule would not have such an effect 2 and would only serve to pre-
vent good faith petitioners from obtaining prompt relief by requir-
ing dismissal of mixed petitions submitted through ignorance of
the Court's holding."
For these reasons, Justice Blackmun voted to remand with direc-
tions that Lundy's unexhausted claims be dismissed, and that if
mun, J., concurring).
58. 102 S. Ct. at 1207 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 1208-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1209 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun believed that the choice
imposed on habeas petitioners by the plurality in part III-C of Justice O'Connor's opinion
will not have the desired effect because he accepted the view of Justice Brennan that a
successive habeas petition filed in federal court alleging grounds which, though then ex-
hausted, had not been exhausted at the time of the filing of the first petition, would not
necessarily constitute an abuse of the writ within the meaning of Rule 9(b). 102 S. Ct. at
1211 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra note 71 and accom-
panying text. The plurality, however, did not accept that interpretation of Rule 9(b). 102 S.
Ct. at 1204-05.
63. 102 S. Ct. at 1209-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun feared that
prisoners who mistakenly filed mixed petitions in the federal district courts might not,
under the Court's holding, be permitted in all cases to simply strike unexhausted claims, but
might instead be required to refile the petition after eliminating the unexhausted claims and
thus suffer considerable delay. Id.
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his exhausted claims were not determined to be interrelated with
the unexhausted ones, that they be considered on the merits.64
In an opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan
concurred in that part of the Court's opinion which imposed a to-
tal exhaustion rule on habeas corpus petitioners. He agreed that
they must choose between returning to state court with their
unexhausted claims and proceeding in federal court with their al-
ready exhausted claims.65 But he disagreed with part III-C of Jus-
tice O'Connor's opinion, where she stated that petitioners who
made the choice of proceeding in federal court with exhausted
claims would run the risk of forfeiting later consideration of the
unexhausted claims in a successive petition under Rule 9(b)."
Rather, Justice Brennan believed that Rule 9(b) could not be read
to permit dismissal of a successve petition in such circumstances.'
Therefore, although he felt that the issue of Rule 9(b)'s correct ap-
plication to successive petitions was not properly before the Court,
he felt compelled to address it in his opinion.es
Beginning with the legislative history of Rule 9(b), Justice Bren-
nan agreed with the plurality that Congress had intended that the
rule adopt the Sanders v. United States" "abuse of the writ"
standard.7 0 This is clear from the fact that Congress chose to in-
clude this language from the Sanders opinion in Rule 9(b).71
64. Id. at 1210 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 1210-11 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 1211 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
70. 102 S. Ct. at 1211 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
71. 102 S. Ct at 1211 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Sanders
held that full consideration of a second or successive petition by a federal district court
could only be avoided if there has been "an abuse of the writ." As an example, the Court
stated that "deliberately" withholding a ground for relief at the time of the first petition in
the hope of receiving two hearings rather than one, or "deliberately" abandoning a ground
for relief at the first hearing might constitute such an abuse. 373 U.S. at 17-18. Tracing this
language through Rule 9(b)'s legislative history, Justice Brennan noted that as transmitted
to Congress by the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee, Rule 9(b) read:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the mer-
its or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the
petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition is not excusable.
102 S. Ct. at 1211 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting H. REP.
No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2478,
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Therefore, Justice Brennan explained, a proper construction of the
Rule required an accurate interpretation of Sanders, which he be-
lieved the plurality had failed to achieve. 2 Instead, the plurality
had distorted the language of Sanders to allow dismissal for abuse
of the writ in a much broader class of cases. 73 Correctly under-
stood, Sanders permitted dismissal in only three types of cases,
stated Justice Brennan. These included situations in which
grounds for relief were deliberately withheld at the first hearing, or
abandoned, or when a court was faced with needless piecemeal liti-
gation or frivolous collateral proceedings.7 4 This meant that dis-
missal for abuse of the writ was appropriate only when a petitioner
could have included all of his claims in his first petition but know-
ingly and deliberately decided not to do so in order to get a second
hearing.76
Justice Brennan then stated that the plurality's attempt to ap-
ply its interpretation of Sanders only reinforced his conclusion
that the Court misunderstood that case.76 He stated that the Court
had equated the position of a prisoner who returns to federal court
on a second petition containing previously unexhausted claims
with that of the abusive habeas petitioner discussed in Sanders.
77
Justice Brennan, however, believed that such a petitioner could
not properly be characterized as abusive of the writ. He thought
that if a prisoner-petitioner was faced with the choice of deleting
the unexhausted claims from his mixed federal habeas petition or
returning to state court with these claims, his abandonment of
2485) (emphasis added). However, Justice Brennan continued, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee believed that the "is not excusable" language "created a new and undefined standard
that gave a judge too broad a discretion to dismiss a second or successive petition." 102 S.
Ct. at 1211 (quoting H. REP. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2478, 2482) (emphasis added). Therefore, that language was replaced by
the words "constituted an abuse of the writ" in order to bring Rule 9(b) "into conformity
with existing law." 102 S. Ct. at 1211 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Id. See supra note 19.
72. 102 S. Ct. at 1212 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Justice Brennan concluded that although the Court could now overrule Sand-
ers, because the "abuse of the writ" standard had been enacted into positive law as Rule
9(b), the Court could not ignore the understanding of Congress that a habeas petitioner's
behavior must be found abusive before the petition may be dismissed. Id. at 1212 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. at 1212 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 1212-13 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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them could not be considered to be deliberate within the meaning
of Sanders.8 This is because the intent of the prisoner in such a
situation who decides to delete his unexhausted claims is not to
obtain two hearings and instead of one or to engage in frivolous
litigation. Rather, it is to gain swift federal relief from confine-
ment.79 To gain such relief, the petitioner is forced to delete his
unexhausted claims.80 When this is the petitioner's purpose at his
first hearing, Justice Brennan found that the submission of the
claims in a second petition after being finally exhausted in the
state courts could not be considered abusive of the writ.8 1 Justice
Brennan concluded that there should be a dismissal for abuse of
the writ only in unusual circumstances truly suggesting abuse. 2
Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
with most of Justice Brennan's opinion, but also agreed with Jus-
tice Blackmun that a total exhaustion rule was inappropriate, and
that the district courts should be permitted to decide the ex-
hausted claims found in a mixed petition unless they were interre-
lated with unexhausted claims.8
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens noted that the case had
raised important questions about the authority of federal judges.8"
Justice Stevens thought that the district judge in this case had
properly undertaken to consider the merits of Lundy's exhausted
claims, but that his review of the actions of the Tennessee courts
had exceeded proper restraints on the collateral review of such
judgments."8 He believed that the holding of the Court would
merely complicate and delay the disposition of such cases.8 6
Justice Stevens then undertook an examination of the facts of
the case.87 He first noted that in evaluating Lundy's exhausted
78. Id. at 1213 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bren-
nan thought that there could be "no 'abandonment' when the prisoner is not permitted to





83. Id. at 1213 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 1213 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. Justice Stevens explained that he disapproved of "[t]he Court's adventure in
unnecessary lawmaking," which "requires some reference to the facts of this case and to my
conception of the proper role of the writ of habeas corpus in the administration of justice in
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claims,"s both the federal district court and the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals had a duty to look at the entire context in which
the alleged errors occurred to determine whether habeas corpus re-
lief was justified." Justice Stevens stated that in denying that fed-
eral district courts had such a duty, the majority was led into error
in two respects. 90 In the first place, Justice Stevens stated that the
Court was wrong in holding that the district court should not have
considered those parts of the trial record relating to the
unexhausted claims until those claims had been exhausted.9" Sec-
ondly, the Court was wrong in holding that district courts could
not consider even the merits of the exhausted claims if
unexhausted claims were included in the petition.92
According to Justice Stevens, the problem with the holding in
Lundy is that some claims of constitutional error are so fundamen-
tal that collateral relief should not be delayed unnecessarily and
certainly not by frivolous unexhausted claims alleged in the same
petition.'3 Justice Stevens distinguished four types of claims of
constitutional error. The first and most common type is where con-
stitutional error is claimed in cases where such error does not in
fact exist.' 4 The second class occurs in cases where there is, in fact,
constitutional error, but that error is insufficient to justify relief
even on direct appeal, much less by way of a habeas corpus peti-
tion. 5 The third type of constitutional error identified by Justice
Stevens is that which justifies reversal on direct appeal, but not a
collateral attack on the conviction.' Finally, there is the class of
constitutional error which may be described as fundamental error.
This category is not susceptible of easy definition, but it is in-
tended to include errors that are so serious that they always justify
the United States." Id.
88. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.




93. Id. at 1215-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1216 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens considered all four of Lundy's
claims to be of this type. Id.
95. Id. Justice Stevens stated that on direct appeal a lesser degree of constitutional
error should justify reversal than would be necessary for the granting of relief upon a habeas
corpus petition, because on direct appeal "the evidence is still fresh and a fair retrial could




relief by way of a habeas petition."'
In the instant case, Justice Stevens noted that the petitioner's
unexhausted claims were not based on any such fundamental error.
In fact, they were of so little merit that they were not raised by
petitioner's attorney at trial or on direct appeal, and were thus
probably waived as a matter of Tennessee law.98 Therefore, Justice
Stevens concluded that under the holding of Wainwright v.
Sykes99 such claims will not justify federal habeas corpus relief
even when exhausted. This being the case, he thought that these
claims should not be the cause of the dismissal of a mixed petition
in which they are included simply because they are alleged along
with more serious claims. 00 Rather, Justice Stevens concluded,
district court judges should have discretion to decide whether or
not to dismiss a mixed petition."' He believed that the inflexible
rule adopted by the Court would deny district judges the kind of
authority needed to effectively administer their calendars. 02 Jus-
tice Stevens stated that the problem of an increasing flood of
habeas applications had resulted from the encouragement given
prisoner applicants by the tendency of many federal judges to treat
the writ almost as a form of direct reqiew. 05 That is precisely what
the writ is not; rather, it is a fundamental guarantee of liberty that
should be reserved for cases involving fundamental constitutional
error.'0 ' Justice Stevens concluded that the Court, in formulating
its total exhaustion rule, had failed to recognize this fact. 05
Although the exhaustion doctrine in general has been presented
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1217 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). In Wainwright the defendant failed to follow a "contempora-
neous objection" rule in that he failed to raise, at either trial or on direct appeal, the issue of
the voluntariness of an inculpatory statement which was admitted into evidence against
him. The Supreme Court held that such a state rule is sufficient to prevent a federal court
from considering in a habeas corpus proceeding any claim based on the admission of evi-
dence not objected to in accordance with the rule, unless the petitioner can show both cause
of his failure to object at trial and actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional viola-
tion. 433 U.S. at 91.
100. 102 S. Ct. at 1217 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Id. Justice Stevens believed that the "availability of habeas corpus relief should
depend primarily on the character of the alleged constitutional violation and not on the
procedural history underlying the claim." Id. at 1218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to the United States Supreme Court many times, 106 the narrow
question of how mixed petitions should be disposed of had not pre-
viously been answered.10 7 Consequently, the issue has been decided
differently in the various courts of appeals. In Rose v. Lundy the
Court has settled the conflict by adopting the minority view ex-
pressed by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in Galtieri v. Wain-
wright'0 8 and Gonzales v. Stone.10 9 These cases imposed a rule re-
quiring the exhaustion of all claims contained within a federal
habeas petition, with mixed petitions to be dismissed. 1 0 The other
courts of appeals had allowed the district courts discretion to rule
on the merits of exhausted claims contained in a mixed petition
and to dismiss only the unexhausted claims. 1' A qualification was
usually provided that exhausted claims would also have to be dis-
missed if they were interrelated to unexhausted claims. 1 2 This
qualification - that exhausted claims be dismissed if interrelated
to unexhausted claims - is necessary as a matter of judicial econ-
omy if there is no rule requiring the dismissal of mixed petitions.
At the same time, however, it burdens the district courts with the
necessity of deciding various questions unrelated to the merits of
the petition."' For example, in Triplett v. Wyrick" the district
106. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59 (1974), where the Court reserved
this issue. Id. at 63-64.
108. 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978).
109. 546 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1976).
110. 582 F.2d at 364, 546 F.2d at 809. Both the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit,
however, adopted only a qualified total exhaustion rule. In Galtieri, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals decided to review the merits of an exhausted claim which had been included in a
mixed petition, when the district court had erroneously reached the merits of the claim. 582
F.2d at 362. In Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit held that although mixed petitions should nor-
mally be dismissed, "considerations of fairness" might require that the exhausted claims be
reviewed when there was unusual delay in state court proceeding, or a "reasonable explana-
tion" for the failure to raise unexhausted claims earlier. 546 F.2d at 810.
111. See 102 S. Ct. at 1201 n.5 (citing Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568, 574 (1st Cir. 1980);
Cameron v. Fastoff, 543 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Tratino v. Ha-
track, 563 F.2d 86, 91-95 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); Hewett v. North
Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1969); Meeks v. Jago, 548 F.2d 134, 137 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); Brown v. Wisconsin State Dep't, 457 F.2d 257, 259
(7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 862 (1972); Tyler v. Swenson, 483 F.2d 611, 614 (8th
Cir. 1973); Whiteley v. Meacham, 416 F.2d 36, 39 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
401 U.S. 560 (1971)).
112. See, e.g., supra notes 35, 36 and accompanying text.
113. See 102 S. Ct. at 1204, where Justice O'Connor characterized the task of deter-
mining when claims are related as being "difficult if not impossible." Id.
114. 549 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1977).
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court had to decide the question of whether to dismiss a petition in
which the only exhausted claims stated were alleged to be frivo-
lous. 15 In Miller v. Hall '16 it was found necessary to, in effect, ig-
nore altogether the question of interrelationship of claims in defer-
ence to important policies served by the habeas corpus writ.117
Similarly, in Hewett v. North Carolina,'1 5 it was necessary to de-
cide a difficult factual question as to whether the exhausted and
unexhausted claims stated were related or not. 1
The effect of the holding in Rose v. Lundy is to make it unneces-
sary for the federal district courts to decide such questions, by re-
moving discretion from district judges and substituting an ironclad
rule governing the application of the exhaustion doctrine of 28
U.S.C. § 2254 to mixed habeas corpus petitions. 20 The require-
ment that mixed petitions be dismissed in all cases without review
of even the exhausted claims has the appeal of any ironclad rule:
it yields a predictable result in all cases and thus eliminates piece-
meal litigation of the particular issue.1" ' In other words, the sooner
the question of whether the petitioner's claims are reviewable is
settled, the sooner the habeas court can proceed to the merits of
the petition. By settling the issue of whether mixed petitions are
115. The court in Triplett held that the district court should not have dismissed de-
fendant's petition due to the presence of an unexhausted due process claim when the defen-
dant was given a longer sentence on reconviction after a successful challenge to his guilty
plea. The court reasoned that Triplett had exhausted other claims made in the same peti-
tion which were unrelated - even though the state alleged that these exhausted claims were
"either frivolous or not cognizable in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding." 549 F.2d at 59 n.2.
116. 536 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1976).
117. The court in Miller held that there was "no problem of interrelationship of rem-
edy" between two exhausted claims and one unexhausted claim which had not even begun
its progress through the state courts after petitioner had been in jail for a year and a half.
The court held that in such a situation, "the balance tips in favor of unimpeded access to a
federal court remedy on claims which have been exhausted." Id. at 969.
118. 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969).
119. In Hewett, the Fourth Circuit determined that the unexhausted claim in Hew-
ett's petition, i.e., that he had been under the influence of drugs at the time of his probation
revocation proceeding, was unrelated to his exhausted claim that he had been unlawfully
denied assistance of counsel at that same hearing. Therefore, the court held, the district
court should not have dismissed the petition but should have instead ruled on the exhausted
claim. The exhaustion doctrine, said the court of appeals, "is not a jurisdictional concept
but simply a flexible matter of comity." Id. at 1320.
120. See 102 S. Ct. at 1199.
121. That this is part of the holding's appeal to Justice O'Connor is apparent from her
agreement with Tennessee's position that "uniform adherence to a total exhaustion rule
reduces the amount of piecemeal habeas litigation." Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).
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reviewable, the Court seeks to encourage petitioners to exhaust all
of their claims in the state courts and then submit only a single
federal habeas petition stating all of these claims.1 22 Justice
O'Connor believed that the exhaustion rule would both reduce the
burdens of the federal courts and at the same time allow a better
review of habeas petitions.
12 3
It is considerations of federal-state comity, however, and not the
prisoner's interest in relief from confinement which are the most
important of the interests advanced in Justice O'Connor's opinion
for the Court.1 24 That the comity policy discussed will in fact be
served seems likely, since those prisoners who are aware of the
Lundy holding will be induced to first present: all claims to the
state courts, as Justice O'Connor indicates.1 25 This is likely to oc-
cur because knowledgeable petitioners will not be inclined to risk a
future dismissal of claims made in a later petition under the plu-
rality's analysis of Rule 9(b). 2 a It also may be admitted that the
increased volume of cases dealing with federal constitutional
claims will enable state courts to become more proficient in dealing
with such issues, as the Court suggests.1 2 7 Nevertheless, in its focus
on the role of the state courts in the enforcement of federal law
and the potential for disruption of that role by federal habeas pro-
ceedings,1 28 the Court has neglected other important interests.
122. Id. at 1204.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 1205, where Justice O'Connor states that the total exhaustion rule was
adopted because it "promotes comity and does not unreasonably impair the prisoner's right
to relief." Id. It is clear that to Justice O'Connor a "reasonable" impairment of the right to
relief would be acceptable, in the name of comity.
125. Id. at 1203.
126. Id. at 1204-05. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
127. 102 S. Ct. at 1203. Justice Blackmun, however, had doubts as to whether federal-
state comity would be served by the Court's ruling. Id. at 1206-07 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
128. See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 H Av. L. REv. 1038
(1970), in which a statement of policies served by the exhaustion doctrine similar to that of
Justice O'Connor is found:
The significant interests protected by the exhaustion requirement are of two
types. First, exhaustion preserves the role of the state courts in the application and
enforcement of federal law. Early federal intervention in state criminal proceedings
would tend to remove federal questions from the state courts, isolate those courts
from constitutional issues, and thereby remove their understanding of and hospitality
to federally protected interests. Second, exhaustion preserves orderly administration
of state judicial business, preventing the interruption of state adjudication by federal
habeas proceedings. It is important that petitioners reach state appellate courts,
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One of these interests is that of efficient federal judicial adminis-
tration, which Justice O'Connor believed would be best served by
the adoption of a total exhaustion rule. 129 If prisoners could in fact
be relied upon to be aware of and understand the command of
Lundy, and accordingly, to appear before the federal district judge
with only exhausted claims, this interest might indeed be served by
the Court's holding. In these cases, there would be complete factu-
al findings made by the state court in which the petitioner's claims
were exhausted, which would aid the federal habeas review. 30 Un-
fortunately, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, this scenario will not
always be in existence because the typical prisoner-petitioner is
not knowledgeable about the fine points of the exhaustion doc-
trine"' and will be likely to unwittingly submit mixed petitions
despite the Lundy holding. 32 The Lundy Court's concern with effi-
cient allocation of judicial resources was also misplaced insofar as
it held that a total exhaustion rule was required to spare the dis-
trict courts from the necessity of ruling on whether claims in a
mixed petition were interrelated. 33 As Justice Blackmun demon-
strated in his opinion, such a holding is unnecessary.' 3 Further-
more, it will not avoid the necessity for at least a summary review
of all petitions to determine whether any unexhausted claims are
included. " 5 This is another problem which calls for the discretion
denied the district courts by the holding in Lundy.
Still another interest is neglected by the Court's ruling: that of
the occasional petitioner unjustly confined due to fundamental
constitutional error which occurred at his trial. District courts will
now be unable to grant the immediate relief required in such cases
which can develop and correct errors of state and federal law and most effectively
supervise and impose uniformity on trial courts.
Id. at 1094.
129. 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
130. See 102 S. Ct. at 1204-05.
131. Id. at 1209 (Blackmun, J. concurring). Justice Blackmun thought that the Court's
"misguided" approach was premised on a mistaken view of the typical "sophisticated litig-
ious prisoner." Id. Even assuming that such a view was correct, he thought that such prison-
ers would still receive multiple hearings by alleging only exhausted claims in each of several
petitions. Id. This result would depend, however, on an acceptance of Justice Brennan's
view of what constitutes an abuse of the writ within Rule 9(b). See supra note 62.
132. 102 S. Ct. at 1209 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra note 63.
133. See supra notes 35, 36 and accompanying text.
134. 102 S. Ct. at 1207 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 1208 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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when the fundamental error is alleged in a mixed petition, despite
the importance of such error with regard to the purposes of the
habeas corpus writ." 6
Perhaps the greatest problem with the Lundy holding, however,
is the fact that it is not expessly called for by the language of 28
U.S.C. § 2254, as Justice O'Connor realized when she stated that
the statute was not expressly directed to the mixed petition is-
sue.13 7 Moreover, as Justice Brennan pointed out,' the result in
Lundy is not required by the rule of the Sanders case as embodied
in Rule 9(b).3 9 This is clear from the language of Rule 9(b), which
states that if a successive habeas petition raising new grounds for
relief is filed, it "may" be dismissed "if the judge finds" that there
was an abuse of the writ.14 0 The thrust of the language is to call for
discretion on the part of the judge in making a decision on the
facts of the particular case."' In light of this, it is clear that if Rose
v. Lundy is not actually inconsistent with the statute and rule, it is
at best a gap-filler intended to deal with an oversight of the
drafter, rather than a strict application of clear statutory language.
The rule is based on the Court's perception of the statute's under-
lying policy considerations." 2 This being the case, the holding in
Rose v. Lundy would seem to be subject to alterations at the hands
of some reconstituted majority of the Supreme Court at some fu-
ture time. This is especially true with regard to Justice O'Connor's
interpretation of Rule 9(b), which was supported by only a
plurality."
3
The main problem, however, for those habeas corpus petitioners
who try in good faith to conform their petitions to the require-
ments of Rose v. Lundy, is the inconsistency of the holding with
136. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
137. 102 S. Ct. at 1202. Justice O'Connor concluded that the statutory language was
too ambiguous to permit any conclusion as to legislative intent; "in all likelihood, Congress
never thought of the problem." Id. at 1202-03. See supra note 5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1976)).
138. 102 S. Ct. at 1213 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139. See supra note 19 (quoting Rule 9(b)).
140. Id.
141. As noted by the Court's Advisory Committee when the proposed Rule 9(b) was
submitted to Congress, "the bar set up by subdivision (b) is not one of rigid application, but
rather is within the discretion of the court on a case-by-case basis." 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254
(1976) advisory committee note.
142. See 102 S. Ct. at 1203.
143. See supra note 39.
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the instructions given in the model form for use in applications for
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.' 44 The petitioner is required
to use this form in filing his petition, except that district courts
may prescribe some other form by local rule. 45 This puts the peti-
tioner in an irreconcilable conflict if he knows of the Lundy total
exhaustion rule, since the model form provides him with the op-
portunity to avoid a dismissal for abuse of the writ by explaining
his reasons for not having previously exhausted any of the claims
listed in the state courts.1 46 That is, the prisoner-petitioner is told
by Lundy that his entire habeas petition will be dismissed if he
includes any unexhausted claims.' 47 On the other hand, the model
form tells him that he may explain his failure to exhaust state
remedies.' 48 The Court in Lundy, however, has made any explana-
tion for the submission of unexhausted claims meaningless by re-
quiring that petitions containing such claims be dismissed in their
entirety without an examination of the merits of any exhausted
claims stated.149 In effect, the district courts are now forced to al-
low the petitioner to explain the presence of unexhausted claims in
his petition, but are then required to ignore the explanation. This
particular anomaly of the Lundy holding, until remedied by Con-
gress through an amendment to the model form, or by the district
courts themselves through a local rule prescribing some other form,
will result in confusion and uncertainty for prisoners bringing
habeas corpus petitions to the federal courts.
George R. Zaiser
144. 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (1976). See supra note 7.
145. See Rule 2(c), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts, 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (1976). See supra note 7.
146. See questions 12 and 13 of the model form, 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (1976). Ques-
tion 12 allows the petitioner to list grounds for relief. Question 13 then instructs him to
explain what grounds were not previously presented "in any other court, state or federal,"
and why. Idi See supra note 7.
147. 102 S. Ct. at 1199.
148. See supra notes 7, 146. In the instant case, Noah Lundy sought to make such an
explanation when he blamed his court-appointed attorney for the failure to assert his
unexhausted claims in the Tennessee courts. See supra note 7.
149. See 102 S. Ct. at 1199.
1982 329

